ENDGAME Litterbox #3 -- patio11 v steinguitar


Gov: patio11
Opp: steinguitar

Judges: Tom H, Mark McD, LWBeauclair

Deadline: 6pm, Wed

Resolution: Rock and Roll Dreams Come True


Thanks very much to the judges (wow, we’ve got an international flavor here today), and of course my esteemed competition. I hope you all enjoy the debate today. With that out of the way, lets get started. Aside from being music, ?rock and roll? has military connotations (c.f. ?Its time to rock and roll?,2 from just about every movie involving a semi-automatic weapon since 1960). ?Dreams come true?, well, a large segment of the Japanese body politic has been dreaming of military action for a good chunk of time now. But I?m getting ahead of myself, lets talk about Sudan.

Holy Non-Sequitur Batman:

You?ve probably heard about it in the news, and if not you need to take a break from the Presidential campaign and start listening to stuff that really matters, but there is massive genocide going on in the Sudan. Arab militias which, with a wink and a nod, are not at all affiliated with the Sudanese government are busy depopulating villages, burning crops, massacring innocents, and what have you. The targets are a mix of both Sunni Muslims and the Christian/animist groups in Sudan, the commonality being that they?re black, not Arab. So its more of a racial/ethnic conflict than a religious one. Anyhow, despite the fact that everybody and their mother is a signatory to treaties which make things like killing 20,000 people and displacing another million a specific crime by the name of genocide, Europe has decided to turn a collective blind eye, partially because they don?t want to be involved, and partially because the Sudanese government has a couple of billion dollars of oil wealth to buy friends with.

This genocide is preventable:

The Red Cross estimated that approximately 20,000 troops would be required to insure safety of the Sudanese civilians and international aid workers (the UN has this nasty habit of pulling out of countries when their employees start getting shot at, which has brought food and medical aid to a standstill). Aside from preventing roving convoys of ?militia? troops depopulating villages, peacekeepers would be on the scene to demand accountability from the Sundanese government, specifically with regards to their habit of ordering bombing missions against civilian targets and then dismissing complaints about them as ?lacking foundation?.

Japan is ready for this:

Japan has the world?s 4th largest military budget (in the vicinity of fourty billion dollars a year), and spends an additional $5 billion or so a year on foreign aid through its Official Development Assistance program, making it the world?s largest contributor. The Japanese Self Defense Forces have been training for peacekeeping missions for the last two decades, and have participated successfully in several, such as East Timor. The ODA program gives Japan a pool of culturally-aware professionals to supplement their armed services, and following existing practice these professionals will be dispatched in support of the military force.

Japan can do it:

You may recall something about Japan having a constitutional impediment against using the armed services. Its Article 9, and means? exactly what the Prime Minister says it means. No joke. All Koizumi has to do is say that Japan?s signature on international conventions against genocide mandates this peacekeeping operation, and Article 9 ceases to apply. Several ?findings of fact? at the top of the legislation authorizing plan would also certify Japan?s obligation in this area and grant the SDF the requisite authority ? this is completely constitutionally kosher, and in line with the process by which Japan participated in both Gulf Wars and numerous sundry PKOs.

Thus the plan:

Japan will dispatch 20,000 combat members of its armed forces, plus the requisite support personelle, to Sudan with orders to stop the genocide, disarm the militias, and reestablish humanitarian aid, as described above. The troops with be given a permissive Rules of Engagement allowing them to fire in defense of themselves or civilians under threat from armed troops or irregulars. The troops will not return until the militias are disarmed and the humanitarian situation has stabilized.

Why you?re voting for this:

I don?t particularly care about treaties. It matters very little to me that there are a bunch of words collected somewhere in English and French which obligate Japan to oppose genocide. What matters to me, very much, is the moral obligation accruing to us all as individuals to do everything in our power to stop it. If the Japanese Diet fails to pass plan, one million innocent people will die. This impact will outweigh any possible disadvantage the Opposition could care to come up with, although I anticipate spending much of my MG coming up with creative turn answers to make judging this round even easier.

And just for a kicker:

The perception of Japan as a neutered country in the SQ contributes directly towards instability in East Asia. Take, for example, the North Korean abduction problem. North Korea kidnapped approximately a dozen Japanese citizens, and keeps asking to bargain for their release with the United States and the US alone, based on the perception that the US is the only player that matters. And as long as Japan is not a ?futsuu no kuni? (?normal country?), as long as the SDF is perceived to be a very expensive collection of toy soldiers, this will be true. Japan striking out on its own will improve stability in East Asia and strengthen the US-Japan security alliance, because it will be closer to an alliance among equals, rather than the US being the obvious ?big brother?.


Halfway across the world (and, bonus points, its actually true from all three countries we?re living in), a bunch of bad men are engaged, right now, in wholesale slaughter of innocents. Japan has the power to stop this massacre. Lets do it. Its time to rock and roll.


Disclaimer: None of the above should be construed as anything but my own opinions, in particular, they do not represent the opinions of Softopia Japan, the government of Gifu Prefecture, or the Japanese government.

  1. is there any resolutions that you wouldn’t link to Japan?
  2. What kind of diet is this? Is it better than Atkins, cuz I here that’s tops.
  3. can you explain “permissive rules of engagement”
  4. Can the Japanese coordinate with other peacekeeping forces?
  5. If they’ve already done this kind of thing before, how does that change their perception in the region?
  6. what does the SDF usually do?

  1. Ones which have “The United States Federal Government should…”, or replace USFG with another non-Japanese actor. Are there any kinds of resolutions all you other people won’t link to Dubya? I mean, I like the guy too, but lets give him a rest this weekend.

  2. Capital D Diet is generally the Japanese Parliament, although I hear that there is a Diet which is actually a diet which is quite popular here, despite the fact that most people I meet are skinnier than me (and that already breaks several fundamental rules of physics).

  3. So when the Japanese went in in Gulf War I and Gulf War II, they had a very strict ROE – there were literally calls back to HQ about whether they were permitted to fire back if fired upon. We dispense with that nonsense, and give them a ROE more in line with the type the US uses – that is to say, we list the occasions you’re permitted to fire under (which I did above), and when in doubt we trust the judgement of the officer on the scene.

  4. Plan doesn’t include any statements about how to deal with foreign peacekeeping forces or space aliens because, to the best of my knowledge, neither are in Sudan at the moment. Absent a CP, which would really make my plan text moot anyhow, the likelihood of there being other peacekeeping forces in Sudan is slightly lower than there being a space alien invasion – see my inherency claims.

  5. I made that claim with regards to the law, which doesn’t care whether you send 1,000 troops to Iraq or 20,000 troops to the Sudan. The rest of the world cares quite a bit how many troops and under whose direction. Japan gets NO credit internationally for being the US’s go-to guy when it comes to funding regime change or staffing reconstruction efforts – elder statesmen like Jimmy Carter just lump Japan in with “all those teeny-tiny little countries” or, in the words of one Congressional Democrat, “nations which you can buy on EBay”. Kim thinks much the same thing, although I doubt he’s heard of EBay. Japan taking on an intervention itself, on the other hand, would be hard to ignore.

  6. Thats a really broad question. Their mandate is protecting Japan. This has been broadened over the years, much like the US military’s, as the circumstances of war and peace have changed quite a bit over the last few decades. It now solidly includes PKOs, in fact, that is their major scenario for overseas deployment.


Stop, collaborate and listen /
i’z gonna post up my bomb opposition/
tomorrow, now i gotta sleep tightly/
i’ll drop the science in the day (yo night) alrighty?


Of course, I’d like to thank all our international participants. Hopefully this?ll be like the Olympics ? especially the drugs. Due to the nature of the format, I have tried to write this as I would talk, with the addition of outline indicators to help structure this if you?re flowing.

Solvency: Japan won’t do a good job.
1. ROE allows protection only thus they can’t pursue and disarm the militias. Even though Patrick allows provisions for the troops to fire, they are not authorized to chase the militias. This isn’t just a vague technicality - it’s inherent to the notion of the Japanese SDF as peacekeeping force, not military.
2. Next, the Sudanese government and people will be resistant. There is a prevailing fear that intervention from the West is a means to steal resources and renew imperialism. The fear is directed toward the US, but close behind will be Japan - the “little brother,” as Patrick says. With resistance from within, it will be more difficult to stop this genocide. Moreover, the presence of an outside, seemingly imperialist force will spur continued support for the militias and make a long term solution even more distant.
3. Lastly, Japanese troops are not trained to stop genocide. The most “military” of their training is maintaining established peace frameworks like in East Timor. They primarily deal with disaster relief and restoring infrastructure, and (rarely) policing. This is a pretty significant change that will require time and training to get right.

Counterplan: African Union sends 20,000 troops with a mandate and the authorization needed to protect people from and disarm the militias. When the genocide is stopped, the troops will go home.
1.competition: The counterplan competes on a net benefits level. i.e., you could do both plan and counterplan, but that would suck. As such, the adjudicators can weigh which would be better - plan or counterplan - instead of just plan versus the status quo.

2. solvency
a.20k troops will suffice it, like Patrick said

b. Authorization extends to disarming the militias

c. Also, the sudanese government is more amicable to an AU force.
i. Considering that the Sudanese government already OK’d limited forces from the AU to protect monitors, Khartoum is at least tolerant of the idea.
ii. Not only has Khartoum has said they will tolerate missions from AU forces as long as they are clearly defined,
iii. They have been cooperating with the AU forces from Rwanda.
iv. This support means better solvency for the genocide, especially in comparison to the Japanese forces.

d. The AU is capable and committed
i. Countries like Rwanda, Libya, and South Africa are already training people for an AU force
[i]ii[i]. Qaddafi loves pan-african shit so there will be the commitment to the cause necessary to see it through to the end.
iii. Remember that doing this has long been a goal of this organization. Fighting and winning these battles is key to strengthening the AU and the collective power of the continent. As such, the countries of the AU will make this work.

advantage: The AU will be strengthened through counterplan.
a.It is a young organization trying to establish itself as a legitimate, useful structure in the eyes of African governments and people?

b. and plan is a very notable, noble coming out party for the AU.

c. At the point where the AU stops debating and starts fixing, the organization grows stronger ? more countries will be more committed to the institution and the cause. They start to reach beyond colonially imposed borders for the good of the region.

d. When the AU is able to construct a strong, united front many good things will happen.

  • They will be better able to arrange debt forgiveness, or at least restructuring, so the countries that dedicate huge sums to paying off interest can grow strong, healthy economies. This will means people are better able to afford food and medicine - especially significant where hunger, HIV/AIDS, and malaria are taking lives at an alarming rate.
  • They will be better able to end international farm subsidies which undercut many farmers on the continent when they can function as a unified economic force which leads once more to the economic benefits mentioned above.
  • They will be able to conduct future peacekeeping operations in their own backyard. Considering that the North (or whatever you call industrialized parties like the US, UK, EU, Japan, etc?) has repeatedly failed to stop violence in Africa, establishing an AU with experience and success in peacekeeping means future instances of genocide will be stopped sooner and more often.
  • They will be able to cast off the yoke of imperial oppression that has been the root of so many of the problems that I?ve mentioned above. Only when the countries of Africa can stand together with strength and power will the effects of years of subjugation be undone.

on case: Since counterplan stop genocide too, all that?s left is the East Asia kicker.
However: He says that a strong Japan will stabilize the region. On the contrary, it will only hurt. If Japan moves toward an aggressive military/international posture, the only real risk is escalation between Japan and North Korea (DPRK). The status quo in the region is relatively stable (in the sense that bullets aren?t currently being fired) and even improving via talks with the DPRK. If Japan decides to become an aggressive international actor, or even a benign yet functioning/active military actor, the DPRK will be forced to reassert it?s strength by renewed missile testing and wholesale withdrawal from those negotiations. As recently as August 10, the abductions have been discussed and this week Australian and DPRK officials are set to discuss the Il-matic?s nuclear plans. Also, there are plans for a new round of six-party talks. If Japan is seen to ?remilitarize? or become a ?futsuu no kuni,? there will undoubtedly be an end to these talks and further destabilization of the region. In short, I just kicked the crap out of his ?kicker.?

  1. Why will this fear of stealing resources materialize from Japan, which sends 3 billion dollars to Africa every year, but not from Libya et al, whom the Sudanese government has given 5 billion dollars of oil easements to?

  2. Lets talk solvency – you say my Japanese troops, which have trained for 20 years to keep peace, have none. What does the training protocol for protecting unpopular ethnic minorities look like in Libya?

  3. What does the ethnic makeup of your multinational peacekeeping force look like?

  4. Assume SQ. What is the likelihood of this round of talks leading to a successful resolution of the abduction problem?

  5. Why wasn’t your remilitarization of NK disadvantage triggered when Dubya went on international television and put Kim on the top three of his personal hit list?

  6. You say the AU forces are already training. Thats nice. How many months until they are as ready to roll as the $50 billion a year SDF is now?

  1. First, the 3bil sort of supercharges the imperialist claim, and if the Sudanese are giving the Libyans oil, then they wouldn’t need to steal it. Next, for the people, it’s the appearance of peacekeepers that will make or break their acceptance and efficacy. If the people on the ground accept the peacekeepers, all the training in the world won?t make a difference. When we examine the government?s fear, it is that of foreign intervention. This would be mitigated, however, because Khartoum is (a) a member of the organization acting (b) and not as afraid of exploitation by African states as they are afraid of exploitation by the intruding, industrialized North.

  2. The training the SDF has is more suited to policing or fixing power stations than to stopping genocide. Both peacekeeping forces will require a great deal of training. Moreover, the proximity of logistical support for the AU force, the fact that they are better acclimated to the territory, and the similarities between the AU force and the Sudanese they need to protect all mean a more effective mission.

  3. Well, Libya is 9x% muslim Arabs, Rwanda has a bunch of catholic Hutus and Tutsis, and there are a fair number of people who adhere to indigenous faiths within the continent. In other words, closer to Sudan’s makeup than the Japanese force would be.

  4. Not very, but there is engagement. Also, it’s more likely than post plan.

  5. Because Dubya is in charge of the USA, not Japan. Duh.

  6. Well, when you factor in distance, training for the mission, and getting logistical support and access from the Sudanese gov’t, they’ll all be there about the same time.


Will have speech up in four hours.

Patrick McKenzie


i look forward to it.

i’m having a good time and I hope you are too.

PS: I just watched the exorcist for the first time ever… so even though it’s four am here, i’m not sure I’m gonna sleep anytime sooon


Sorry, got called out of the office and they tragically don’t consider my hobbies to trump actual work. Any minute now.

Patrick McKenzie


This round in brief

The fact that the plan will solve for genocide better than the counterplan is going to be the only issue in this round. I will now go through the arguments in the order the Opposition presented them, but first I have one point which I?ll keep referring to.

Cooperation with the Sudanese government is NOT a good thing. The militias engaging in genocide are being backed by the Sudanese government, to the extent that the government is giving them freaking air support. If you give the government any control over the peacekeeper?s mandate, and the desire by the AU to remain buddy-buddy with them gives them that control, they will use that control to frustrate the aims of the mission. That?s exactly what that requirement that the parameters be ?clearly defined? means ? it means that they?ll only support efforts which are clearly defined to not oppose their interests too much. Opposition claims that cooperation is key to solvency, but given that the government has an active interest in killing off its political opponents and seizing their oil, this is exactly backwards from the actual truth of the matter.


  1.   Opposition claims that the Rules of Engagement don?t allow pursuit.  Nope, after Koizumi and the Diet certify the objectives of my mission (and you?ll note I had ?disarm? specifically in the plan text), the SDF gets full license to legally pursue that objective.
  2.   Opposition claims that the Sudanese government and people will resist.  I addressed why the Sudanese government will always resist efforts to stop [b]their[/b] genocide above.  Also, the counter plan won?t mollify the people any more, because they will see Sudan?s billions of dollars of oil wealth flowing to the AU (whereas not one dime goes to Japan) and see this for what it is ? payment for services rendered (specifically, for turning a blind eye to the worst abuses).  
  3.   Opposition claims that the SDF has not trained for this.  This is simply false ? Japanese training excercizes, including joint excercises with the US, have consistently emphasized the military side of PKOs as well as reconstruction, they?ve just never put them into practice before.  Also, they are a darn sight better trained than Libyan and Rwandan conscripts, and don?t allow Opposition to just wave his arms around and magic away this fact.  Finally, they are ready to get on the boat today, whereas putting together a multinational force and training them will take months.  Japan has the largest navy in the world and can have the troops to Africa within three weeks ? I will eat my hat if Rwanda et al can have 20,000 troops ready in under three months.


On solvency: Opposition claims that the AU can solve. Horsepuckey ? the troops, especially Libyans, have an incentive to abet genocide, because they?ll be the recipient of the oil wealth of the depopulated south. Second, don?t try to make diversity of the force an advantage when they?re walking straight into an ethnic conflict ? there will be infighting between the various factions in the force, based nationality, ethnicity, and religion (what happens when our democratic, black South Africans are tasked to protect a village that Qaddaffi has payed his thugs to level?) Also, remember it will take months to get this force ready. One million died in Rwanda in under one hundred days. Sudan does not have months, it needs action and it needs it now, the AU is structurally incapable of providing this. Tick tock.

On commitment: Commitment is meaningless because the only thing the troops are committed to is the appearance of doing something, not actual solvency (solvency removes the oil incentive for that ?cool Pan-African guy? who apparently is the lynchpin of this effort). Second, there is no argument anywhere that Japan will not be genuinely committed to this enterprise, and don?t make that argument for the Opposition.


Note that the advantage stems from solvency ? if genocide still happens, none of this advantage comes true. This is important because I proved that the AU will not solve above. The AU will be ended by this intervention, just like the Rwanda debacle effectively ended the Organization of African States. Also, genocide TODAY outweighs any of these ridiculously powertagged advantages that may happen many years down the road, and the AU can always find another place to cut its teeth in the interim. And this ?cast of the yoke of imperial oppression? is transparent BS which the Sudanese government is using in the status quo to discourage intervention by troops they don?t own ? don?t play into their hands.


Not that it really matters, because genocide outweighs the fate of the fifteen kidnapped Japanese, but Opposition has already conceded the chance of these talks working is slim. I?ll go one better ? they?re doomed, like the last FOURTEEN YEARS of talks with the North Koreans, and they?re doomed because Japan has no cards to play other than threatening a walkout. Time to restore a bit of sanity by rejecting this endless cycle of worthless talks and demonstrate to NK that Japan will not be bullied.

You?ve got a clear choice in this round ? stop genocide with the SDF, which is better qualified to do it under any rational standard than an unspecified multinational force, or let pan-African pipe dreams kill solvency while another million Africans die. Rock and roll, government.


Much love, it?s been fun.

[b]1. counterplan issues: or why the AU force will try to stop the genocide

a - fiat[/b] Ok, I was hoping to avoid this, but I have no choice. Throughout the MG, I am told that the AU will ?turn a blind eye? and ?abet genocide.? Regardless of the leanings of the Libyan government, my ability to enact a counterplan has not been contested. That is to say, just like Patrick gets to send Japanese troops with a mandate to do such and such and the strength of the Japanese government to keep them in line, I get to send AU troops with a mandate to do such and such and the strength of the member nations to keep them in line. His arguments are akin to me saying that George W. Bush won?t enforce new EPA regulations if Patrick passes plan for the USFG to enact new EPA regulations. These arguments are countereducational and hurt debate since we are unable to discuss ideal policy options because we are constantly hindered by inherency. This is why we have fiat ? to get past the inherent barrier to see if the proposed course of action is a beneficial one. He?s given no articulation as to why I don?t get fiat, or how my fiat is limited, he?s only blankly stated that my forces will do the opposite of the mission they?re assigned. I?m not fiating solvency of the object, just another actor. Let me have it.

b - incentive Simply put, there is no incentive for Qaddafi to perpetuate the genocide. Patrick says he gets oil money, but that doesn?t explain it. If he wants oil money, he could get more if Darfur was stabilized and capable of better output. More to the point, Qaddafi has plenty of money, and the ability to strengthen the AU ? a key economic asset ? is reason enough for him to stop the genocide. His pan-Africa agenda is dear to him so he won?t let it get messed up ? this is brought up from the beginning of the LOC and has not been addressed. So even if I don?t get to fiat them acting legitimately, I?ve proven they will.

2. Cooperation: Ok, he says the Sudanese gov?t won?t really help the AU all that much. Fine, I?ll grant that they won?t be the best of buds, but they?ve already shown that they?re willing to tolerate and aid AU monitors. This is happening in the status quo and they will continue to help. Even if they put up roadblocks, they will be no worse than the ones Japanese forces will face. In fact, the AU force will at least get its foot in the door more easily ? in fact, they already are getting it in there.

Also, the people are still going to be more likely to accept the AU than the SDF when they?ve been hearing all these rumors about exploitiation by the industrialized North.

3. plan solvency

  1. plan allows the SDF to fire ?in defense of themselves or civilians under threat from armed troops or irregulars,? not launch offensives against militias. This is an important distinction because the ability for the SDF to launch offensives against militias is equivalent to waging war ? though I?m not going to pick a fight over legality, the interpretation I?m offering falls in line with both history and the text of plan.

  2. As regards government assistance, the arguments above apply here. As regards the attitudes of the people, his argument that the AU will turn a blind eye is ludicrous (cross apply incentives arguments)

  3. Well, Rwanda has already sent 150 and is readying more, Nigeria is asking for permission to send 1500, Libya and South Africa both have rather large and well trained militaries. If they are called upon with the urgency dictated by the situation, I?d say they?d get there pretty damn quick.

counterplan solvency
His argument here is ?Libyans will abet genocide.? All this is addressed up top, but again: how does Libya gain from continued chaos? The number one item on his foreign agenda is the success of the AU. I?ve mentioned this from the LOC and Pat has never told me why something else is going to trump that ? don?t let him do it in the PMR.

He says that Japan will be committed ? I haven?t contested that (I thought fiat covered it), but now that fiat is in the air: maybe the Japanese just want to help Halliburton set up in town. Maybe they?ll abet the genocide for the good of the oil business, or just try to bring the appearance of stability so the US can lift sanctions. I don?t think these arguments make good debates, so I?m not going for them. However, if you?re going to question the resolve of the AU force, maybe you should question the resolve of Japan?s as well.

AU advantage
he says advantage only happens with solvency and solvency won?t happen because the Qaddafi isn?t committed. However, I tell you Qaddafi is determined to make the AU work. It?s a beautiful cycle that leads to my solvency and this advantage.

Even if I don?t win solvency, however, the experience and unity forged by working together will still lead to the impacts I spoke about.

He says the AU can find another place to ?cut it?s teeth,? but it?s this attitude that ?this is too important for the AU, let?s let the big boys handle it? that is preventing the AU from getting anywhere. In fact, failure to act ? even to try ? will lead to the AU following the path of the OAS that Patrick mentions.

Last, the colonialism ?bs? is only being used by the Sudanese gov?t to stop forces from the North, not AU forces of which they?ve already welcomed some.

DPRK Dis/Advantage to Plan
Patrick never responds to my analysis that Japan asserting itself will destabilize the region. Yes, genocide is terrible and must be stopped, but forcing a nuclear North Korea to assume a markedly more offensive posture in the face of a remilitarized Japan is important to consider. I?m not saying that plan directly leads to a nuclear attack, but I am saying that you will see a deterioration in relations, a resumption of small conventional conflicts, and even a risk of a nuclear event.

Why you?re voting Opp:

1. Opp stops genocide better:
the troops are committed,?

First, fiat says so, but even without that, Libya has no incentive to allow the genocide to continue. Firstly, it weakens Qaddafi?s AU if there is a failure and second, success might mean more oil production for him to steal.
? they?ll be there,
Rwanda and Nigeria have troops ready to go and South Africa and Libya are waiting. The Japanese may have trained, but they?re still going to have to get mobilized and trained for this mission? there are time deficits for both plan and counterplan. And at least the AU can disarm the militias.
? and supported by the Sudanese
As regards the government: they?re helping some AU forces and will continue to for a while. Even if they retract support, the help they provide in getting established will be invaluable. As regards people: They?ll more likely be accepted and trusted by the people of Sudan which means they?ll be more effective once there. This was uncontested. So even if there is a week or two long difference in arrival times, the effect of Sudanese support and the ability to pursue militias would cancel out the effect.

2. Counterplan helps the AU
Patrick says this relies on solvency which is blocked by Qaddafi? who really wants this advantage to happen. Ergo I get solvency and the advantage. I don?t know what ?power tagged? means, but you will save thousands of lives that are lost due to hunger and disease in the short term, and a long term sustainable economy in Africa will save millions more.

3. Counterplan doesn?t destabilize East Asia
As I mentioned before, Japan-DPRK relations aren?t great, but they?re at least open. Post plan, DPRK has to dig in its heels and there is no hope of a solution in the near future. Like I said before, I?m not saying that nuclear accidents will happen, just that it?s a risk.

How you?re evaluating this round: Plan and Counterplan both solve? I?d argue that c/p does so just as well, if not better, than plan, but at the very least, both will stop genocide.

Counterplan, however, also avoids the DPRK disadvantage and gains the AU advantage. Remember everything I said the AU could do with counterplan: if they don?t step up now, they?ll be condemned to the same fate as the OAS and Africa will be worse off for it. Also factor in the risks that come when the DPRK freaks out with a crazy leader and a nuclear program. With these positions, counterplan is way cooler than plan. It?s ice cold.


I want to lead off with the fact that Darryl is the man for having his speech ready on time for me. As are the judges, for slugging through it (Lucy gets honorary ?the man? status for the day).

There is no way in heck that the AU solves better for genocide than the SDF. And that?s all she wrote, folks.

Ability to Pursue

Scroll up, its written into the plan text. Remember that nice pacifistic Japan? That?s past tense, I?m issuing hunting licenses with ?genocidal militiaman: no bag limit? stamped on them. And I can do it, too.

Counterplan Stuff:


Please extend the fact that while the Japanese have professionals who have devoted their life to humanitarian efforts in the Sudan, the South Africans and Rwandans have no such resource and come from completely different cultures. They have not trained exhaustively for peacekeeping, like my SDF has. While the SDF has some relevant peacekeeping experience and great amounts of training Rwanda and South Africa have NEVER mounted any sort of intervention anywhere by themselves, AND they would have additional trouble with cooperation. Further extend that ethnic and religious infighting within the AU force, especially by the perfidious Libyans, will just cause more death in a country that?s got plenty of that already.


Crib-sheet for the Brits : Darryl and I agree that he gets to say ?a bunch of Libyans end up in the Sudan with a government mandate which says X?. I disagree with Darryl that this means the Libyans will actually do X ? the Libyan government is a despicable regime which routinely says one thing and does another, and they?ve got billions riding on killing the southerners in Sudan. Darryl says Libya just wants stability, but this just increases their incentive to genocide ? when you kill all potential opponents you get an awful lot of stability. If there are any ethnic minorities in the South they?ll have competition for the oil, if there are none?


Rwanda has one hundred fifty troops ready to go. Great. The other 19,850 will take months to assemble and train. The Japanese SDF is the world?s fourth largest standing army and can be there now (remember, three weeks from the time you sign your ballot they start getting off the boats). If you wait months we?ll be talking about these victims in the past tense. Remember, Rwanda saw 10,000 deaths per day. You can?t afford to wait ?one or two weeks more? (Darryl?s scenario), much less three months (mine).

AU Advantage

Because AU can?t accomplish this mission, the civilians are doomed. The AU will be FOREVER branded as the group that screwed the pooch in the Sudan, just like the OAS was the big loser after Rwanda. That means that all of these advantages he claims comes from a strong AU will be crushed.

North Korea Disadvantage

Look, the current negotiations are doomed in the status quo, and they?re doomed because NK has no incentive to ever take Japan seriously. Plus, genocide outweighs, because if NK was going to go nuclear they would have done it when President Bush put them on the Axis of Evil list, which was a much bigger direct provocation.

Sudanese Government Support

Sudanese government support is a real bad thing, because you?re screwed when they withdraw it, and withdraw it they will. They?re directing the genocide, and providing the milita with bombing support. The objective is billions of dollars in oil wealth, they?re not going to suddenly have a change of heart here. You don?t want to send in peacekeepers who will be controlled by their ties to the Sudanese government, and it is conceded that the AU wants to be their friends and is willing to let genocidal bygones be bygones.

Thanks much guys, its been a great round. If you can say, with a straight face, that Libya and Rwanda will be able to put 20,000 troops on the ground in three weeks, that these troops will be better trained than anything their country has ever produced, and that despite a 5 billion dollar carrot dropped in front of a murderous dictator they will stop the genocide, then you should vote for Darryl. Nope, not likely. Face the music, its time for Japan to rock and roll.


Am I allowed to put my ballot up yet? Because I’m ready.



though i’d like to see it, i think we need to wait til all three ballots are in so as not to influence the other judges with your (fabulous, I’m sure) interpretation of the round.

did the fabulous line sway your ballot?




what about my charm and dashing good looks?